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Abstract The right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment is invariably associated with ‘human dignity’. The idea
of dignity plays some role in this right’s interpretation, although the content of
the idea in this context, as in others, is unclear. Making sense of the dignity
idea involves a number of challenges. These challenges give rise to the
methodological-type question at the heart of this article: how should human
rights lawyers go about articulating the content of ‘dignity’? The article pro-
poses, and models, a methodological approach in response. Its core argument is
that human rights law needs the vocabulary provided by theorizations of dignity
but that these theorizations should be anchored in authoritative human rights
jurisprudence. It argues that this approach can help make sense of the dignity
idea in a way that facilitates a richer understanding of its influence on
interpretation.
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Introduction
The right not to be subjected to torture is paradigmatic of the international human
rights regime’s aspiration to protect human dignity.1 The prohibition of torture and
associated harms is described as having Ba particularly prominent role in uphold-
ing human dignity^ (Feldman 1999, 690), as Bunderpinned^ by the idea of human
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dignity (Cassese 1991, 143) and as concerned with harm that is Bmanifestly
contrary to human dignity^ (Costa 2013, 400). Yet, it has also been observed that
dignity2 is not the Bwhole story of the wrongness of torture^ (Waldron 2012, 143).
There has been little consideration of the impact of the dignity/torture pairing on
interpretation of the terms that constitute the right and the consequent scope of
protection afforded by it to individuals who claim to be victims of its violation.
This article begins to address the under-theorized relationship between the dignity idea
and the right not to be subjected to torture, from the perspective of human rights law. It
asks how, in interpreting the right not to be subjected to torture,3 human rights lawyers
should make sense of the content of its ‘underpinning’ dignity idea in a way that can
illuminate its interpretive scope? The interpretive scope of this right has long been, and
continues to be, a question of great significance. The article begins by illustrating this
point. It then describes the challenges of making sense of dignity’s meaning, which give
rise to the central methodological-type question: where should human rights lawyers look
to identify the relevant content of the idea of dignity and how should these interpreters4 go
about articulating this content? It puts forward a methodology for responding to this
question, described as a form of ‘constructive’ human rights interpretation. The following
section models this methodology to offer an example of how it might be applied. The first
part details how ideas about dignity play out in one instance of application of the right and
asks what kinds of harm the right is being used to protect against. It uses the example of
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Article 3 ECHR is
invariably cited as an example of the dignity idea’s use in legal adjudication (see, e.g.
McCrudden 2008, 19). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR; the Court) has
generated the largest body of case law and principles on the prohibition of torture, and
although the language of dignity is neither explicit in the ECHR, nor in the text of Article
3, it is frequently invoked by the Court in the interpretation of both. For these reasons,
Article 3 jurisprudence forms the case study for identifying the relevant content of the idea
of dignity. The second part of this section, addressing both human rights lawyers and
dignity scholars, engages with some dignity literature to demonstrate how the case-study
findings can be orientated within theoretical perspectives.
In summary, the article articulates the complexity of the question—of how interpreters
should go about making sense of the dignity idea—and demonstrates how this complexity
can be overcome by pursuing a dynamic methodology that is anchored in practice and
mediates practical and theoretical perspectives. It argues that human rights law needs the
vocabulary provided by theorizations of dignity and that, at the same time, theorizations of
dignity should be viewed from within the limits of human rights jurisprudence if they are
to make a practicable impact on interpretation. Human rights lawyers, in particular
authoritative human rights interpreters (courts and monitoring bodies), are not necessarily
well-placed to undertake exploratory engagement with human dignity theory; this is not a
criticism but a feature of the legal role (Nussbaum makes a similar point discussing
emotional concepts in adjudication contexts; see 2004, 67–68). Such human rights
2 This article makes no conceptual distinction between the terms ‘dignity’ and ‘human dignity’.
3 References to the right not to be subjected to torture, or to the prohibition of torture, are used as a way of
succinctly referring to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; this form of expression
does not intend to diminish the significance of the ‘associated’ harms.
4 The term ‘interpreters’ might refer to any actor with a stake in a right’s interpretation, but its use herein is
restricted to human rights lawyers (practitioners and scholars).
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interpreters, as well as those who do engage with theorizations of the dignity idea, can
benefit from the insights of dignity theorists. This article advocates an approach that can
allow human rights interpreters and dignity theorists to make sense of the content of the
dignity idea in a conceptually nuanced, useable way, in turn helping to realize the dignity
idea’s contribution to interpretation of the right not to be subjected to torture.5
Dignity and Interpretation of the Prohibition of Torture
Interpreters understand the terms torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading to express
harms6 that are antithetical to dignity protection. They assert or implicitly assume that
the right should protect against harm to dignity in some ‘direct’ or ‘basic’ sense.
Inquiring into the content of the idea of dignity can provide a resource for evaluating
this right’s interpretive scope.
When legal interpreters find that a particular harm falls within the scope of one or more
of the terms torture, cruel, inhuman and/or degrading treatment/punishment, this interpre-
tive inclusion activates special practical and symbolic consequences: In practical terms, it
is the first step towards recognizing harm that a state cannot excuse or justify within the
human rights framework; in symbolic terms, it is an acknowledgment that an individual’s
suffering has been or would be particularly grave. These special consequences mean that
interpretation of the right assumes special significance. The meanings of (and boundaries
between) the forms of harm within the right have in recent years been most prominently
questioned in the USA,7 and such interpretive concerns are longstanding: Dayan notes
that, in a response to the UN Committee Against Torture, the USA maintained that a
reservation to the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment remained motivated by the ambiguity of the terms
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (Dayan 2007, 78–82). These ‘other’ forms of harm
have traditionally been explored less than the interpretation of torture.8 The interpretation
of the term torture is well developed (on the basis of the definition in the Convention
Against Torture), but interpreters continue to challenge even this relatively detailed
understanding, for example, in its restriction to the acts of public officials.9 The evolution
5 It might also be argued that dignity theory needs human rights law, in the sense that human rights
jurisprudence could illuminate wider social and philosophical understandings of the dignity idea (see Cane’s
analysis of the idea of responsibility, where he argues that law has something unique to say about moral
concepts like responsibility because of the particular characteristics, and special position, of the social
institution of law (Cane 2002). It has been suggested that international human rights discourse has Breshaped^
the dignity idea (Donnelly 2015, 14), and human rights law is commonly perceived as the framework for the
recent dignity Brevolution^ (Barak 2015, 34). Such an argument is not an integral part of the present article,
which focuses on interpretation of the prohibition of torture.
6 This article uses the term ‘harm’ and ‘dignity harm’ throughout. The terminology of harm might be
interrogated, but it has been chosen as the most helpful broad, non-specific and succinct way of encompassing
a range of expressions, including offenses to dignity, hurt to dignity, violations of dignity and so on.
7 The scope of the different forms of harm was referred to in one of the US ‘torture memos’ (see Bybee
Memorandum, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§2340-2340A, 01 August 2002).
8 Recent examples discussing the other forms of harm include Murtagh (2012), Waldron (2010) and Webster
(2011).
9 For a recent discussion of the prohibition of torture and harm brought about by non-state actors in the context
of trafficking, see McGregor (2014).
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in the interpretation of the right to date is remarkable—it now encompasses a broad
range of circumstances, from harms like corporal punishment10 to mental suffering
caused to next of kin by authorities’ reactions to disappearances. 11 Interpretive
questions applied to the right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment are ongoing. As the right’s interpretation con-
tinues to mature across the international and regional protection systems, the need
for a nuanced appreciation of the conceptual boundaries of this absolute, fundamen-
tal right will grow in importance.
Human rights interpreters universally acknowledge a link between this right and the
idea of human dignity. They also link other rights to the idea of human dignity12 but
tend to use as their primary example the right not to be subjected to torture (e.g.
Andorno 2009, 229; Gearty 2005, 94; Waldron 2013, 4). Interpreters recognize the
inclusion of dignity language alongside the prohibition of torture and associated harms
in international and regional instruments 13 and invoke it in interpretation. 14 These
connections, recognized and affirmed by interpreters, suggest that an interpretive link
exists between the idea of dignity and the kind of harm that counts as torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading. It must be presumed that this interpretive link can have tangible
consequences in individual claims before human rights monitoring bodies and courts.
To explore the influence of the dignity idea on the scope of protection afforded by the
absolute prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
interpreters need to understand its relevant content.
The Challenge of Dignity’s Meaning
Human rights law does not give an obvious response to the question of what human
dignity means, and the large, growing body of scholarship on dignity gives a sense of the
vast range, and conceptual richness, of possible responses to questions about meaning.
Human rights jurisprudence either refers to the term dignity only implicitly, or
explicitly but without elaboration. Although case law harbours the idea, it does not
10 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Curtis Francis Doebbler/Sudan, Comm. No. 236/00,
04 May 2003.
11 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, González et al. (BCotton Field^) v. Mexico, Judgment of 16
November 2009, para. 424.
12 See overview given by, e.g. McCrudden (2008, 687–694), including capital punishment, protection of
private life, freedom from discrimination and socio-economic conditions.
13 Organisation of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, Article 5(2); Organisation
of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981, Article 5; United Nations General
Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
1984, Preamble.
14 See, e.g. the following: African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Sudan Human Rights
Organisation & Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE)/Sudan, Comm. No. 279/03-296/05, 27
May 2009, e.g. para. 164; African Commission on Human and People’s Rights,Gabriel Shumba v Republic of
Zimbabwe, Comm. No. 288/2004, 02 May 2012, para. 164; UN Human Rights Committee, Postovoit v.
Ukraine, Comm. No. 1405/2005, 110th Session 2014, para. 9.3; UN Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 20: Article 7, Forty-fourth session (1992), para. 2; Committee Against Torture, Concluding
Observation, El Salvador, CAT/C/SLV/CO/2, 09 December 2009, para. 22; Committee Against Torture,
Concluding Observation, Andorra, CAT/C/AND/CO/1, 20 December 2013, para. 18; European Court of
Human Rights, Tyrer v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A, no. 26, para. 33.
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make its substance transparent. Individual claims tend to show little conceptual en-
gagement with the content of the idea of dignity, following the general trend of
international human rights law. This regime does not give an express statement of the
content of the idea of dignity in the text of its international or regional instruments
despite according the idea a key place in its genesis; as Oscar Schachter wrote, dignity’s
Bintrinsic meaning has been left to intuitive understanding […]^ (Schachter 1983, 849).
There is no discernible unified understanding of this idea in the drafting history of the
key international instruments that have made it foundational within human rights
discourse (Beitz 2013, 265–270). As such, interpreters must look for an understanding
of the idea of dignity that fits—with hindsight—the international human rights regime
as it has come to take shape. This will be an understanding of the dignity idea that can
help to make sense of its relationship to individual entitlements within the body of
international human rights law (Beitz 2013, 261–268). Interpreters need something
more than what is visible in existing human rights instruments.
Broader sources of insight into the meaning of the dignity idea inhibit human rights
interpreters’ search for meaning in a different way. Interpreters might look to the way
that the idea is understood and articulated beyond human rights jurisprudence,15 but this
is a complex picture. The meaning of the idea has been described as abstract and
perplexing; Luban, for example, has written Bnotoriously […] human dignity is a vague
and multiply ambiguous concept […]^ (Luban 2015, 274). In theoretical dignity
literature, which has greatly expanded in recent decades,16 interpreters will find the
dignity idea located within various discourses and constituted by overlapping dimen-
sions pertaining to both substance and function (e.g. Kass 2008; Meltzer Henry 2011;
Neal 2012; Riley 2010; Shultziner 2007).
There is another strand to the complexity of the dignity idea’s meaning: Its meaning
might seem quite clear as it pertains, not to human rights law in general but to the
prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment specifical-
ly. Some very basic dimension of dignity’s meaning is often presumed to inhabit the
sphere of this right; a sense that harm to dignity means treating a human person as if
s/he was not a human person (Waldron 2013, 4).17 Some writers align the idea of
dignity in a basic sense with the Kantian-inspired idea of treating a person like an object
(Barak 2015, 146–147; Maurer 1999, 288; Riley 2010, 124). Some writers view this
‘object formula’ approach as of limited value from a legal perspective (Hörnle 2012,
311) or as an easy assumption (Waldron 2012, 26–27). Either way, it is not clear how
something like the Kantian-inspired object formula might guide decisions in human
rights cases about the prohibition of torture’s scope. If the idea of dignity as it pertains
15 Many scholars have collated the history of the dignity idea. A particularly comprehensive, yet concise
reading is found in Barilan (2012, chapter 2).
16 Several sources within the body of literature are cited below. Other examples from the past 10 years include
Addis (2015), Andorno (2013), Baertschi (2014), Byk (2010), Clements (2011), Daly (2012), Dilley and
Palpant (2013), Dupré (2015), Hiskes (2015), Hughes (2011), Jacobson and Silva (2010), Kalb (2011), Kateb
(2011), Khaitan (2012), Kirchhoffer (2013), Lee and George (2008), Neal (2014), Pellegrino et al. (2009), Rao
(2011) and Schroeder (2012). Two further recent sources, which provide a clear sense of the scope and
diversity of the literature and include extensive bibliographies, are Düwell et al. (2014) and McCrudden
(2013).
17 This kind of harm is often understood as something that is intuitively grasped; see, e.g. Shultziner (2007,
86–87). See also Riley, who observes that dignity is Boften observed in the breach^, continuing, B[t]orture is a
prime example of how dignity appears in this way.^ (Riley 2008, 125).
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to the right not to be subjected to torture has a basic meaning, questions remain about
what this consists of and what it implies for the right’s application.
There are a number of challenges then for making sense of the idea of dignity in
interpretation of the right not to be subjected to torture and associated harms: Human
rights jurisprudence does not make its understanding of dignity apparent and does not
always openly use the language of dignity, mirroring wider human rights discourse;
dignity theory literature is a rich resource for helping to understand the dignity idea but
is not easy to navigate; the dignity idea might be presumed to have a basic meaning, in
a formulation that is insufficient to guide human rights decision-making. In light of
these challenges, what meaning should the idea of dignity assume in the context of the
prohibition of torture, and, as a prior question, how should this meaning be discerned?
A Methodology for Bridging Practice and Theory of Dignity
The question of how to make sense of the relevant meaning of the dignity idea presents
itself as a methodological one: how should human rights interpreters go about articu-
lating the content of the dignity idea in a way that can best provide tools for
understanding the prohibition of torture’s interpretative scope? To respond to this
question is to put forward a methodological approach. This section puts forward an
approach that reaches out to theoretical expressions of the dignity idea but in a way that
anchors them in human rights practice. It outlines a justification for this approach,
highlights its main constitutive elements and considers how it can meet the challenges
of the dignity idea’s meaning.
The methodology’s starting point is the prohibition of torture’s record of application.
It focuses firstly on how dignity has played out in past applications of the prohibition,
in individual claims under particular human rights instruments before authoritative
interpreters of those instruments. This approach is motivated at a basic level by an
understanding of the dignity idea’s ‘meaning’ as reflected in the way that the term is
used in practice (in the legal context, see Bix 1995; Endicott 2002, 948). It is also
motivated by a pragmatic perspective, in the simple sense that any postulated meaning
of the dignity idea should be capable of integration into the existing practice setting, so
that the idea has potential to be impactful in that setting. It seeks a meaning of the idea
that is reflected in, and can remain realistically anchored within, existing applications of
the right.
This approach to making sense of the dignity idea might be described as construc-
tive: It seeks an understanding that can be incorporated into an existing interpretive
context, and it is orientated towards productive, practicable outcomes. This label
evokes constructive interpretation in law more broadly, associated with Ronald
Dworkin’s understanding of legal interpretation. The particular advantage of evoking
this association is that constructive interpretation is understood to engage with moral
and social values (Dworkin’s Bcommunity morality^ (1977, 123–130)). The method
advocated here is constructive in the sense that it is inherently open to integrating
‘extra-legal’ sources. It echoes Beitz’s approach to understanding the idea of dignity
(noted above), which involves looking for input from beyond human rights discourse
(2013, 270). The method is dynamic, open to moving back and forth between the
reality of dignity in practice and theoretical conceptualizations.
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The methodology is an interpretive one. Ascribing meaning to the term dignity
found in prohibition-of-torture jurisprudence is a form of human rights interpretation.
In the human rights field, interpretation has as its most obvious object the written text of
the rights themselves, but the exercise of deriving meaning from human rights case law
is equally one of interpretation (Barak 2005, 3, 11; Bos 1984, chapters vi and vii; Raz
1996, 362). The object of interpretation in the suggested approach is the term dignity in
prohibition of torture jurisprudence.
This approach of constructive human rights interpretation entails a relationship
between a practice-based, and a theory-based, perspective on the idea of dignity that
works in two directions but that ultimately refers to the former. It understands human
rights practice to be receptive to conceptualizations of the social value of dignity. It
presumes that authoritative interpreters who invoke the dignity idea when applying the
right not to be subjected to torture do so with the intention that it should in some sense
reflect this broader social value; that prohibition-of-torture dignity is connected to the
social value of dignity. In this sense, practice-based human rights law perspectives are
open to communicating with theoretical perspectives. At the same time, this approach
entails that theoretical conceptualizations of the dignity idea are incorporated within the
special constraints of legal decision-making. They will be moulded by the limited
parameters of human rights law claims and the need for relevant concepts to be
instantly applicable to particular sets of facts. The ensuing benefit is that this method-
ological lens brings to an understanding of the dignity idea a pragmatic urgency;
interpreters cannot afford to become lost in abstract conceptualizations (Cane makes
a similar point about legal ‘versions’ of moral concepts (2002, 12)). The approach of
constructive human rights interpretation views the body of jurisprudence on the
application of the right not to be subjected to torture as its own ultimate point of
reference for what dignity means in this context. ‘Making sense’ of the dignity idea
means arriving at a picture of the dignity idea’s meaning that reflects its micro-context
(its sphere of application) and its macro-context (the wider social backdrop to its sphere
of application), but the former will be the ultimate reference point for determining the
dignity idea’s relevant meaning.
Making Sense of Dignity’s Meaning: a Model
This section aims to show how practical and theoretical perspectives can reinforce each
other in a way that allows for the development of a practice-rooted yet conceptually
rich way of talking about the dignity idea’s meaning, which has the potential to inform
decisions about the prohibition of torture’s scope of interpretation. It thereby models the
constructive approach to interpreting the dignity idea.
When this approach is put into practice, it must confront the special challenges of
dignity’s meaning. Firstly, it involves piecing together use-examples. However, the
examples in the context of the right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment are pictures of dignity violated, detached from a
way of positively articulating the relevant content of the dignity idea. This echoes the
absence of an expressed positive articulation of dignity’s meaning in wider human
rights discourse. Secondly, the use-examples must be fleshed out by drawing dynam-
ically upon broader sources (theoretical conceptualizations of the dignity idea), but
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these sources are themselves difficult to navigate and often seem either too complex or
too basic. It is not clear how to move from the limited substance of the dignity idea
visible in case law, to a way of expressing the substance of the dignity idea that can
inform the prohibition of torture’s application.
This section indicates how a constructive human rights interpretation approach can
overcome these challenges. Although a more wide-ranging exercise is desirable, it aims
to model the approach by way of example. It offers a case study of prohibition-of-
torture case law, followed by a discussion of some theoretical conceptualizations of the
dignity idea and a suggestion for mediating between practical and theoretical
perspectives.
A Case Study of Dignity in Practice: Dignity harm in ECHR Jurisprudence
This part of the discussion looks to the jurisprudence of Article 3 ECHR as an
illustrative case study of how dignity plays out in interpretation. It aims to go a step
further than acknowledging when the ECtHR invokes the idea of dignity; it aims to
distil something about interpreters’ perceptions of the substantive content of the idea by
spotlighting the nature of the suffering that the Court has judged to align with the scope
of the right’s terms and to give rise to Article 3 violations.
The starting point is the Strasbourg Court’s perceived oppositional relation-
ship between the idea of dignity and the harm proscribed by the right in
Article 3. The jurisprudence shows a polarity between dignity and Article 3
harm that conforms to common intuitions that torture, inhumanity and degra-
dation are the antithesis of respect for human dignity. For example, the ECtHR
has stated that
[…] [T]he Court finds that the conditions which the applicant was required to
endure were an affront to human dignity and reached the threshold of degrading
treatment for the purposes of Article 3.
When a person is confronted by the police or other agent of the State, recourse to
physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by the person’s own
conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right
set forth in Article 3 of the Convention […]18
The Court has stated that B[…] treatment […] may be incompatible with the
standards imposed by Article 3 in the protection of fundamental human dignity […]^
19 and B[…] the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are
compatible with respect for his human dignity […]^.20 It has stated that treatment has
Bundermined^ dignity, that it has Bstripped^ an individual of dignity, 21 that it has
18 M.S. v. The United Kingdom, 24527/08, 03 May 2012, para. 45, and Rizvanov v. Azerbaijan, 31805/06, 17
April 2012, para. 49 respectively. For further examples see Iwanczuk v. Poland, 25196/94, 15 November 2001,
para. 59;M.S.S. v. Belgium And Greece [GC], 30696/09, 21 January 2011, para. 263; Yudina v. Russia, 52327/
08, 10 July 2012.
19 Keenan v. United Kingdom, 27229/95, 03 April 2001, para. 113.
20 McGlinchey and Others v. United Kingdom, 50390/99, 29 April 2003, para. 46.
21 Piechowicz v. Poland, 20071/07, 17 April 2012, para. 141.
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Bdiminished^ dignity,22 that it has not been Brespectful^ of dignity23 and that Article 3
harm can occur where an individual feels Bhurt in his dignity .^24 As early as the 1978
Tyrer case, the Court described the protection of dignity as Bone of the main purposes
of Article 3^. 25 The Strasbourg Court perceives proscribed Article 3 harm as the
diametric opposite of respect for dignity.
In light of a dignity/proscribed harm binary, the case law includes a spectrum of
practical ways in which the Convention’s interpreters materialize their perceptions of
how human dignity is harmed. Practices that are incompatible with Article 3 are linked
to the written text of the Convention through the Court’s ‘definitions’ of torture,
inhuman and degrading treatment—harm can be described as torture when it is
considered to be deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering;
harm can be inhuman if it is, inter alia, premeditated, applied for hours at a stretch and
causes intense physical and mental suffering; harm that is degrading is brought about
by feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of humiliating or debasing a person,
that breaks a person’s physical or moral resistance, drives a person to act against will or
conscience or has an adverse effect on personality.26 These definitions give some shape
to the dignity picture in Article 3. This picture is rooted, however, in the concrete
circumstances in which the dignity idea plays out. The examples of dignity harm below
intend to provide a detailed picture of the range of situations that the ECtHR has
identified as giving rise to Article 3 violations,27 focusing on what each case indicates
about the kinds of practices that the Court sees as capable of bringing about harm that
amounts to torture or to treatment that is inhuman and/or degrading.28 This range of
situations will inform the subsequent discussion of theoretical perspectives on dignity.
Deprivation-of-liberty contexts (during arrests and in prisons, police stations, immi-
gration centres and health care settings) are often, but not exclusively, the backdrop for
‘environmental’ dignity harms under Article 3. Harms include being confined to a
severely overcrowded space leading to sleep deprivation, being subjected to constant
lighting, not being allowed adequate ventilation, suffering overheating, sharing a
confined space with insects and pests and being obliged to eat close to toilets. Being
compelled to use squalid and/or exposed sanitary arrangements is a recurrent feature of
cases in which the Court finds a violation of Article 3.29 Poor sanitary arrangements
have extended to being deprived of personal hygiene products, such as toothbrushes.30
22 Salikhov v. Russia, 23880/05, 03 May 2012; M.S. v. The United Kingdom, para. 44.
23 Sochichiu v. Moldova, 28698/09, 15 May 2012, para. 40.
24 Mouisel v. France, 67263/01, 14 November 2002, para. 48.
25 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, para. 33.
26 Ireland v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A, no. 25, para. 167.
27 Examples are drawn from cases in which a violation of Article 3 was found. It would also be possible to
look at cases that did not arrive at a finding of a violation, for example because responsibility of the respondent
state was not engaged, but nevertheless say something about how the Court understands harm to dignity
through certain practical examples.
28 It is sometimes difficult to pin down how the dignity harm is constituted. See, e.g.Mubilanzila Mayeka and
Kaniki Mitunga v. Belgium, 13178/03, 12 October 2006; in this case the Court refers to both action and
omissions by the Belgian state, and it is not clear what the inhuman treatment is—the fact of the young
applicant’s detention, and/or the conditions in which she was detained? There is also sometimes a cumulative
aspect to situations of dignity harm, which the overview in this section aims to capture.
29 Kalashnikov v. Russia, 47095/99, 15 July 2002; Peers v. Greece, 28524/95, 19 April 2001; Price v. United
Kingodm, 33394/96, 10 July 2001.
30 Melnitis v. Latvia, 30779/05, 28 February 2012.
Interpretation of the Prohibition of Torture
The Court has condemned physical and psychological intrusion. It has aligned
subjection to strip searches, repeatedly, or accompanied by aggravating factors, with
harm to dignity. For example,
Obliging the applicant to strip naked in the presence of a woman, and then
touching his sexual organs and food with bare hands showed a clear lack of
respect for the applicant, and diminished in effect his human dignity.31
The Court has further condemned insult and derision that aggravated a strip-search
situation.32 In Yankov v. Bulgaria, concerning the forced shaving of a prisoner’s hair,
dignity harm derived from suffering an involuntary, publicly visible change in physical
appearance. 33 The Court has condemned being forcibly administered drugs under
physical restraint for the purpose of obtaining evidence of crime34 or being forced to
undertake psychiatric treatment after arrest. 35 Dignity harm has often derived from
gratuitous restraint, using chains 36 or belts, 37 and from being publicly displayed
wearing handcuffs or a hood (including in front of family members and acquaintances)
38 or being placed in a cage (including in front of family members and judicial officers).
39 The Court has aligned dignity harm with being deprived of mental and physical
stimulation likely to diminish Bmental faculties and social abilities^40 as a result of
prolonged deprivation of human contact,41 and mental anguish caused by fear of a
death sentence after an unfair trial,42 and latterly a death sentence in itself.43
The Court has suggested dignity harm to lie in Binsecurity and helplessness^. 44
Features of Article 3 case law include being deprived of food on the day of a court
appearance,45 being prohibited from addressing one’s family in one’s mother tongue
and being transported to court hearings in overcrowded conditions, including being
compelled to sit on the laps of other prisoners,46 or in circumstances not adapted to
additional needs, including for wheelchair users.47 In Davydov and Others v. Ukraine,
31 Valasinas v. Romania, 44558/98, 24 July 2001. See also the Court’s comments on forcibly stripping a woman,
deprived of liberty, in the presence of male staff inWiktorko v. Poland, 14612/02, 31 March 2009, para. 53–54.
32 Iwanczuk v. Poland, 25196/94, 15 November 2001, para. 59.
33 Yankov v. Bulgaria, 39084/97, 11 December 2003; see also Members Of The Gldani Congregation Of
Jehovah's Witnesses And Others v. Georgia (71156/01, 03 May 2007, para. 18) in which one applicant’s hair
was shaved in a religiously motivated attack that was recorded on film.
34 Jalloh v. Germany, 54810/00, 11 July 2006.
35 Gorobet v. Moldova, 30951/10, 11 October 2011.
36 E.g. Hénaf v. France, 65436/01, 27 November 2003; Avci and Others v. Turkey
70417/01, 27 June 2006.
37 Wiktorko v. Poland, 14612/02, 31 March 2009.
38 Erdoğan Yağiz v. Turkey, 27473/02, 06 March 2007.
39 See respectively Petyo Petkov v. Bulgaria, 32130/03, 07 January 2010 and Piruzyan v. Armenia, 33376/07,
26 June 2012.
40 Głowacki v. Poland, 1608/08, 20 October 2012, para. 90.
41 A.B. v. Russia, 1439/06, 14 October 2010; Piechowicz v. Poland, 20071/07, 17 April 2012; Razvyazkin v.
Russia, 13579/09, 03 July 2012.
42 Koktysh v. Ukraine, 43707/07, 10 December 2009.
43 Al-Saadoon And Mufdhi v. The United Kingdom, 61498/08, 02 March 2010 (see, in particular, para. 137).
44 Slyusarev v. Russia, 60333/00, 24 April 2010, para. 36.
45 Moisejevs v. Latvia, 64846/01, 15 June 2006.
46 Khudoyorov v. Russia, 6847/02, 08 November 2005.
47 Engel v. Hungary, 46857/06, 20 May 2010.
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dignity harm stemmed from being used in staff training exercises in a prison, during
which physical abuse and insults were common.48 Being deprived of a personal set of
clothing, and habitually expected to wear whichever clothes the authorities decided to
re-allocate, contributed to dignity harm in the care home case of Stanev v. Bulgaria.49
Dignity harm has repeatedly resided in situations of insufficient medical care when
deprived of liberty.50 The Court has emphasized that authorities have waited too long
before seeking medical care, have failed to take proper records of treatment and/or have
responded negatively to treatment requests.51 Harm has been brought about by author-
ities’ failure to take seriously repeated requests for medically necessary aids52 or requests
to be moved from an environment that induces deterioration of already-poor health.53
Within and beyond deprivation-of-liberty settings, dignity harm is found in the unwar-
ranted use of physical force, with or without long-term consequences.54 The Court notes
aggravating factors where present. For example, in Sochichiu v. Moldova, it observed
Besides the brutal force used against the applicant, the Court notes from the video of
the arrest that the conduct of the police officers was far from being respectful of the
applicant’s dignity. In particular, one of the police officers stepped on his head and
did not remove his foot, even when brushing his trousers. In the Court’s opinion,
such conduct is degrading and humiliating. The Court also notes the mocking of the
applicant’s losing some of his teeth and the swearing by one of the officers.55
The Court has condemned the suffering of intentionally inflicted severe physical and
verbal abuse, including witnessing the abuse of children, other family and community
members.56 This has included witnessing the destruction of one’s home and possessions
57 and being trampled upon after being forced to the ground (in view of loved ones).58
InMembers of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia,
the violence was exacerbated by the recording and broadcasting of the attacks. 59
Dignity harm has included being threatened with violence and witnessing extra-
judicial executions of relatives and community members.60 It has been characterized
by the suffering of prolonged physical and verbal bullying.61
48 Davydov And Others v. Ukraine, 17674/02, 39081/02, 01 July 2010.
49 Stanev v. Bulgaria, 36760/06, 17 January 2012.
50 Some examples are Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, 54825/00, 05 April 2005; Ukhan v. Ukraine, 30628/02, 18
December 2008; Kaprykowski v. Poland, 23052/05, 03 February 2009.
51 E.g. McGlinchey and Others v. United Kingdom, 50390/99, 29 April 2003.
52 Slyusarev v. Russia, 60333/00, 24 April 2010 (authorities’ failure to return or provide glasses for poor
eyesight).
53 Elefteriadis v. Romania, 38427/05, 25 January 2011 (authorities’ placing of applicant with a lung condition
in a cell with smokers).
54 See respectively, e.g.Muradova v. Azerbaijan, 22684/05, 02 April 2009 and Barbu Anghelescu v. Romania,
46430/99, 05 October 2004.
55 Sochichiu v. Moldova, 28698/09, 15 May 2012, para. 40.
56 Members Of The Gldani Congregation Of Jehovah's Witnesses And Others v. Georgia, 71156/01, 03 May
2007.
57 E.g. Yöyler v. Turkey, 26973/95, 24 July 2003; Hasan İlhan v. Turkey, 22494/93, 09 November 2004.
58 Ahmet Ozkan and Others v Turkey, 21689/93, 06 April 2004.
59 Members Of The Gldani Congregation Of Jehovah's Witnesses And Others v. Georgia, para. 105.
60 Musayev And Others v. Russia, 57941/00, 58699/00, 60403/00, 26 July 2007.
61 Đorđević v. Croatia, 41526/10, 24 July 2012.
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Harm to dignity beyond deprivation of liberty situations has often consisted in
suffering indifference. Individuals have suffered indifference in the face of severe
mental anguish and repeated requests for information62 and in the face of an urgent
need for medical attention.63 In medical-related cases, dignity harm has stemmed from
wilful, manipulative obstruction of requests for access to prenatal genetic testing64 and
lawful abortion.65 In medical cases like these, dignity harm appears also to derive from
being effectively made to act against one’s will.66 Dignity harm has consisted in being
obliged to undertake military service at an advanced age without modifications to the
service programme67 or being forced to undertake physical exercise during military
service that knowingly exacerbated a health condition. 68 The Court has identified
dignity harm in situations of indifference on the part of state authorities to one’s
circumstances of extreme, potentially interminable poverty. 69 Extreme poverty in
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece entailed for the applicant Bseveral months, living in
the street, with no resources or access to sanitary facilities and without any means of
providing for his essential needs^.70
The detail of these situations conveys dignity harm in practice. Therefore, although
human rights law does not explicitly say what the idea of dignity means and Article 3
case law does not explicitly put forward any particular conceptualization, the detail of
these situations gives a significant impression of how human dignity is harmed through
torture, inhumanity and degradation. Authoritative interpretations of the right are the
starting point, and the detail of the case law narrates something significant about the
substantive content of human dignity as this idea takes shape through the right’s
application. A list of instances of dignity harm does not, however, suffice. This list
indicates how dignity is harmed, but it does not allow an adequate response to the
question of how to articulate the content of the idea of dignity in a way that could be
useful in decisions about the interpretive scope of the right not to be subjected to torture
and associated harms. A list of past instances of dignity harm needs to be supplemented
in a way that can inform questions about the right’s scope that are forward-looking.
Conceptual Mapping of the Dignity Idea
It is not obvious how to move from the limited substance of the dignity idea visible in
prohibition-of-torture jurisprudence (point A) to a way of expressing the substance of
the dignity idea that can inform application of the prohibition of torture (point B). This
is where theoretical conceptualizations of dignity must be called upon. Theorizations of
62 See, e.g. Akkum and Others v. Turkey, 21894/93, 24 March 2005; Luluyev and Others v. Russia, 69480/01,
09 November 2006; Varnava and Others v. Turkey, 16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 16069/90,
16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90, 16073/90, 18 September 2009; Kadirova And Others v. Russia, 5432/07, 27
March 2012.
63 Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, 32704/04, 17 December 2009.
64 R.R. v. Poland, 27617/04, 26 May 2011.
65 P. and S. v. Poland, 57375/08, 30 October 2012.
66 This is well summarized in an Amnesty International intervention in the case of P. and S. v. Poland, para.
77.
67 Taştan v. Turkey, 63748/00, 04 March 2008.
68 Chember v. Russia, 7188/03, 03 July 2008.
69 M.S.S. v. Belgium And Greece [GC], 30696/09, 21 January 2011; Rahimi v. Greece, 8687/08, 05 April 2011.
70 Para. 263.
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the dignity idea form a complex web of ideas, which has to be navigated to move from
point A to point B. The following discussion approaches theoretical conceptualizations
of the dignity idea with a view to facilitating this transition. It focuses on a number of
themes that are visible in dignity theory. Doing so provides a map that compresses
theoretical conceptualizations of the dignity idea. It does so in order to guide inter-
preters of the right from the above list of instances of dignity harm towards an
interpretation of the dignity idea that could inform interpretive decisions about what
should fall within, or be excluded from, the scope of the terms torture, cruel, inhuman
and degrading.
Theoretical dignity literature exhibits a degree of Bconceptual chaos^ (Meltzer
Henry 2011, 176), the result of a wide range of approaches and frameworks with
diverse starting perspectives, all addressing ostensibly the same thing,71 but in the midst
of this web of dignity conceptualizations, a number of themes stand out. A number of
themes can be seen in theoretical literature, which encapsulate different facets of the
dignity idea. The discussion below focuses on three such themes in dignity literature,
described as the character of dignity, the dimensions of dignity and the demands of
dignity. These are the facets of the idea that can most clearly be moulded into a simple
and effective conceptual map.
The character of dignity aligns with the question, what is dignity. This is a
preliminary question that is sometimes responded to in a way that says too little (for
example, that dignity is ‘something that people have’) or in a way that says almost too
much (for example, that it ‘refers to’ intrinsic value (Andorno 2009, 233), which seems
to go beyond the character of dignity to point towards a substantive underpinning about
why dignity is recognized in persons as opposed to what dignity is). The character of
human dignity is different to its content. Scholars have variously described dignity as a
Bnormative property^ (Birnbacher 1996, 118), a Btype of value^ (Rosen 2012, 19–23),
72 a Bpotential^ (Pollmann 2010), a Bneed^ (Shultziner and Rabinovici 2012, 107) and
also as a Bprocess^ (Lickiss 2007, 35). Recently, Waldron has suggested that it is best
conceived of as a Bstatus^ (Waldron 2013, 24–27), an idea that others have also begun
to explore (including Beitz 2013, 283–288). Literature increasingly situates the char-
acter of dignity as a conceptually distinct aspect of the idea, and the case study supports
this. The references in the case study are to dignity as something that is diminished,
shown a lack of respect, hurt, undermined, assaulted and interfered with. In talking
about what happens to dignity, the case law implicitly says something about what
dignity is. The way that the Strasbourg Court talks about torture, inhuman and
degrading treatment suggests that it perceives dignity as some kind of standing, that
is able to be diminished, undermined and so on. The case study says something about
the way in which certain forms of harm interact with a person’s dignity. The charac-
terization of dignity as a ‘status’, although still a developing idea, is an approach that
sits comfortably within the case-study example.
Dimensions of dignity refers to a central conceptual distinction to emerge from
theoretical dignity literature. This is a dual conceptual distinction between dignity as
71 One notable difficulty is that writers qualify the idea of dignity in ways that are subtly (yet significantly)
different, e.g. dignity Bas^ or dignity Bconnotes^ (see respectively Shultziner and Rabinovici (2012, 109) and
Riley (2008, 129).
72 In discussion of a Kantian understanding of dignity.
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something constant that is acted upon and dignity as something variable that must be
realized. This constant/variable distinction is one of several dual distinctions that are
associated with the idea of dignity. Some do not relate directly to dignity; rather, they
relate to different meanings of the idea (for example, Shultziner’s distinction between a
thick and a thin meaning of human dignity (2007) or to different orientations of dignity
protection (for example, Dupré’s distinction between views of human dignity that
‘open’ inwards or outwards (2009)).73 There are other twofold distinctions that relate
directly to dignity as something that itself has two dimensions. Andorno has described
dignity as having two senses, Bontologique^ and Béthique^: Dignity has an ‘ontolog-
ical’ dimension in which it is part of the existence of a human person and as such exists
equally amongst persons. Dignity has an ‘ethical’ dimension in which it is dynamic; it
depends on a person’s actions and is therefore not possessed in uniform measure by all
(1997, 37). This is similar to the way that Maurer describes (the legal principle of)
dignity in her insightful study of the ECHR: It has an elemental dimension
(‘fondamentale’) and a realizable or active dimension (‘actuée’) (Maurer 1999, 50–
58). Kass refers to Bbasic^ dignity and Bfull^ dignity (2008, 9): Dignity has a basic
dimension in which it is foundational and equal amongst human beings (2008, 27) and
a full dimension in which it can actively flourish as each individual lives her or his life
(2008, 19–20). Within the body of literature, it is common to find such dual conceptual
distinctions between dignity as something that is acted upon and dignity as something
that is realized. These dual distinctions capture the sense that dignity has a narrow
dimension that must be safeguarded and a more expansive dimension that has to be
realized and promoted through practical measures. The dimension of dignity that is
visible in the case study is dignity as an object of harm; it is something (e.g. a standing
or status) that can be suppressed. There is little evidence in the case study of the
Strasbourg Court condemning failures to promote a positive realization of a person’s
dignity. The ECtHR also interprets torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment to be prohibited regardless of individual actions.74 Article 3 concerns harm
to dignity in its narrow dimension.
The literature expresses many understandings of what human dignity is concerned
with. These understandings tend to fall into two categories (which can be seen to map
onto narrow and expansive dimensions of dignity): respect for dignity implies freedom
from certain conditions, and the pursuit of particular states or environments. These
aspects constitute the demands of dignity, the requirements that are recognized to flow
from dignity. The demands of dignity are crystallized understandings of how dignity is
assaulted and how it is promoted. Literature that refers to the way in which dignity is
assaulted tends to use the language of ‘degradation’ and ‘humiliation’ (e.g. Shultziner
2007; Shultziner and Rabinovici 2012). Often, the literature does not elaborate on these
ideas (e.g. Schachter 1983); sometimes it develops them further, as seen, for example,
in Shultziner and Rabinovici’s substantive understanding of humiliation as injury to (or
threat of injury to) a sense of self-worth, where they perceive humiliation as a form of
Bdenial of social recognition^ (Shultziner and Rabinovici 2012, 107, 112). Beitz refers
to how dignity is assaulted with reference to the destruction of a capacity of self-
73 Dupré advocates a view of dignity that Bopens^ Binwards, relating to the inner mental and emotional world
of the person; and outwards, relating to the person's social and relational identity and being^ (2009, 194).
74 Chahal v. United Kingdom, 22414/93, 15 November 1996, para. 79–80.
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direction (referring to torture, cruel, degrading treatment, slavery and forced labour)
(Beitz 2013, 289). In the bioethics field, Birnbacher’s approach suggests that dignity is
assaulted by the deprivation of Bbasic goods^: the necessary means of existence,
freedom from pain and minimal liberty and self-respect (Birnbacher 1996, 110). Whilst
the literature associates a sense of minimal protection with dignity assaults, it associates
something more maximal with dignity promotion. It encompasses various approaches
to, and ways of expressing, how human dignity is promoted by, for example, empow-
erment of agents (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2001, 218), respect for individual
freedom (Dworkin 1994, 239), individual freedom and social justice (Kelman 1977)
and respect for freedom of choice (McDougal et al. 1980, e.g. 465). Dignity literature
seems to say two key things that address the substance of dignity: as Shultziner
describes these imperatives, Bthe should^ and the Bmust not^ (2007, 77). The case
study reflects the latter; the domain of Article 3 ECHR is undeniably ‘dignity-
assaulted’.
When the case-study jurisprudence is situated within conceptualizations of the
dignity idea, the distinctions around character, dimensions and demands of dignity
are most immediately relevant. These distinctions, in light of the case study of dignity
harm, lead to a view of dignity as something like an elemental status that can be
negatively suppressed (can be the object of suppression) by, for example, injury to a
sense of self-worth/destruction of a capacity for self-direction/denial of basic goods.
Several questions arise, as will be noted below, but it is the process that is significant in
this modelling of the constructive approach to making sense of dignity’s meaning—this
expression of dignity fits interpretations in which it is used.
This modelling exercise has aimed to situate the meaning of dignity that was
extracted from the examples of its use within broader conceptualizations of the idea.
It has intentionally avoided trying to assess substantive conceptions of the dignity idea;
others are better placed to (continue to) do this work. It has aimed to contribute
something different, to take a birds-eye view of some dignity theory literature to inform
a practical human rights law perspective. It presents only a snapshot of the literature
and focuses on evidencing relevant recurring themes and dichotomies. The literature
offers other themes and dichotomies that do not map so immediately onto Article 3
jurisprudence75; themes such as the subject of human dignity (the individual versus the
community) and the source of human dignity (the question of why dignity is recognized
in individuals) do not relate as directly to the content of the idea of dignity that was
shown by the case study to play out in the scope of the terms within the right not to be
subjected to torture and associated harms. These other themes do, however, point
towards further questions, that cannot be addressed here, which might influence in
some way the interpretive limits of the right. The three themes of character, dimensions
and demands help articulate the substance of the idea of dignity in a way that resonates
with the kinds of harm that are visible in the jurisprudence.
The next step is to call upon dignity theorists to further unpack the substance of each
of these relevant aspects of dignity’s prohibition-of-torture meaning. Only some brief
reflections can be given here of what this process of unpacking might entail: For
75 See Eglė Venckienė who maps human dignity onto the idea of human beings as ‘dichotomous’: B[…]
human being as a biological–spiritual creature (static feature) and as a social creature (dynamic feature) […]^
(2011, 94), and Kass writes that dignity can Bshine^ or it can be Bextinguished^ (Kass 2008, 306).
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example, to unpack the question of what dignity demands in this context is of obvious
value, being at the heart of understanding the scope of meaning of the terms that
constitute the right. Ideas like humiliation, injury to a sense of self-worth and denial of a
capacity for self-direction are alternative means of expressing how dignity is assaulted.
These ideas themselves need to be substantiated, and more needs to be said about
which expression best reflects prohibition-of-torture jurisprudence. Birnbacher’s ap-
proach, which focuses on the deprivation of basic goods, refers to the necessary means
of existence (1996, 110), something that features in ECHR case law.76 Humiliation
might also include deprivation of the necessary means of existence, depending on how
that idea itself is conceptualized (e.g. Margalit 1996). The ECtHR generally aligns the
term humiliation with degrading treatment specifically and not with inhuman treatment,
and although more often than not it sees both of these forms as co-existing, there are
equally many instances in which it places harm under only one of these headings—is
humiliation the most useful term to express how the right as a whole assaults dignity? If
assault to dignity is expressed as denial of a capacity for self-direction, does this
encompass symbolic harm (Rosen 2012, 96)?77 More generally, how do torture, cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment differ, if they all protect against assaults to human
dignity? Dignity theorists alongside human rights interpreters should focus on a closer
look at these demands, as well as dignity’s character and dimensions.
A conceptual map of relevant aspects of the dignity idea’s meaning can help to move
between practical and theoretical perspectives. It has the added advantage of keeping
dignity scholars and human rights law interpreters on track to minimize the risk of
straying into conceptual territory that is not of direct concern in interpretation of the
right not to be subjected to torture and associated harms. This part of the discussion has
thereby aimed to model a way of expressing a prohibition-of-torture meaning of the
dignity idea that is nuanced, conceptually precise and yet practice-rooted.
Conclusion: Towards an Understanding of Dignity’s Meaning
in Interpretation of the Prohibition of Torture
The right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment intends to protect persons in some fundamental sense, and this
quality will continue to render questions about the parameters of this right
particularly pressing. These parameters are widely accepted to bear some
interpretive relation to the idea of dignity, and so it is necessary to make sense
of this idea’s meaning if interpreters are to take seriously its influence on the
scope of the right’s terms. As Waldron notes, Bloose^ usage of the term dignity
in some instances can be afforded (2013, 29), but in others, this usage would
benefit from being tightened up—precision is required when questioning
dignity’s role in interpretation. With greater precision will come the possibility
for interpreters to be able to fully evaluate the relationship between the ideas of
dignity and torture, inhumanity and degradation and the implications for indi-
vidual claims in particular contexts in practice.
76 E.g. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.
77 On the ideas of symbolism and humiliation, see Jacobson (2009) and Kuch (2010).
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This article has explored how interpreters should go about making sense of the
content of the idea of dignity with a view to better understanding its influence on
interpretive scope. It has proposed a methodological response described as a form of
constructive human rights interpretation. This method addresses the special challenges
of the idea’s meaning: the limited story about dignity’s substance that is visible in
current authoritative interpretations of the prohibition of torture, overly complex or
overly basic theoretical conceptualizations of the dignity idea that are difficult to
navigate or apply and the need for a ‘map’ to help interpreters make sense of the
dignity idea, to move from the idea’s limited substance that is visible in prohibition-of-
torture jurisprudence, to a way of expressing its substance that is capable of illuminat-
ing and informing the right’s application. Further, this should be a way of expressing
dignity’s meaning that can not only inform an understanding of dignity’s influence on
the scope of application of the right to date but which can equally inform questions
about its influence on the scope of application of the right in future. The constructive
interpretation method is a dynamic approach, which is anchored in human rights
practice but, recognizing the limitations of what can be learnt from this practice, looks
to theoretical conceptualizations of the dignity idea beyond legal human rights discourse.
In modelling this approach, to give an example of how it might look in practice, the article
has aimed to integrate the outlines of a story about dignity’s meaning found in authori-
tative interpretations into broader theoretical conceptualizations of the idea. It has done so
by focusing on three conceptual themes—of dignity’s character, dimensions and de-
mands—which are particularly apt for understanding dignity within the right not to be
subjected to torture and associated harms.When dignity is articulated as something like an
elemental status that can be suppressed by humiliation, etc., the conceptualization of a
basic dignity that tends to be aligned with the prohibition of torture gains more layers.
This approach sets up the next level of enquiry that is needed and at the same time limits
the sources that are appropriate to inform it. Situating the dignity idea in this way draws
lines around the things that can be and, importantly, need to be said about the relevant
substance of the idea of dignity. This moves towards a richer understanding of the dignity
idea’s part in shaping the critical and evolving interpretation of a fundamental right.
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